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198 AETNA BLDG. MAINTENANCE Co. v. WEST [39 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 21876. In Bank. July 8, 1952.] 
AETNA BUILDING MAINTENANCE COMPANY, INC., 
Respondent, v. JAMES A. WEST, Appellant. 
[1] Injunctions-Soliciting Customers of Former Employer.-In 
the absence of an enforceable contract containing covenants 
to the contrary, equity will not enjoin a former employee 
from soliciting business from his former employer's custom-
ers, provided his competition is fairly and legally conducted. 
[2] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Right to Engage 
in Occupations.-An employee has the right to advise his 
employer's customers that he is severing his business rela-
tions with the employer and engaging in business for himself. 
[3] Words and Phrases-"Solicit."-Term "solicit" implies per-
sonal petition and importunity addressed to a particular in-
dividual to do some particular thing. 
[4] Id.-"Solicitation."-Merely informing customers of one's for-
mer employer of a change of employment, without more, is 
not "solicitation." 
[5] Id.-"Solicitation."-Willingness to discuss business on invita-
tion of another party does not constitute "solicitation" on 
the part of the invitee. 
[6] Injunctions-Receiving Business From Customers of Former 
Employer.-Equity will not enjoin a former employee from 
receiving business from the customers of his former em-
ployer, even though the circumstances be such that he could 
be prohibited from soliciting such business. 
[7] !d.-Trade Secrets.-Even in the absence of solicitation, an 
employer is entitled to protection against his employee's use, 
or disclosure in competition with him, of trade secrets given 
to the employee only for the purpose of carrying on the em-
ployer's business. 
[8] !d.-Soliciting Customers of Former Employer.-Equity will 
not enjoin solicitation of former employer's customers where 
there is no evidence that the former employee sought out pre-
ferred customers or that there are such customers in the trade, 
where accounts are sold on the open market at flat rates with-
out regard to either their duration or profitableness, where the 
[1] Injunction against employee's solicitation of customers, 
notes, 23 A.L.R. 423; 126 A.L.R. 758. See, also, Cal.Jur., In-
junctions, § 17; Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 108. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Injunctions,§ 25; [2] Constitutional 
Law, § 120; [3-5] Words and Phrases; [6-11] Injunctions, § 25; 
[12] Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 32. 
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business is highly competitive and patronage depends on 
efficiency of service rather than personal relationship, and 
where contracts are of brief duration and cancellations are 
frequent. 
[9] !d.-Trade Secrets.-Rule that equitable protection may be 
invoked against subsequent use by a former employee of 
knowledge of the peculiar likes, fancies and other character-
istics of former employer's customers in case such knowledge 
will aid him in securing and retaining their business applies 
where friendly contact with customers is important to solici-
tors, but not where superiority of product or service, rather 
than personal relationships or a secret specialty, is the basis 
for patronage. 
[10] !d.--Trade Secrets.-Matters of public knowledge or of gen-
eral knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by 
one as his secret. 
[11] !d.-Trade Secrets.-Evidence merely showing that build-
ing maintenance company utilized a highly efficient system 
designed to meet competition and avoid losses, but failing 
to show that the method of making estimates was secret or 
that former employee was informed of any claim of secrecy, 
is insufficient to prove a trade secret. 
[12] Trademarks and Unfair Competition-Evidence.-Evidence 
is insufficient to sustain finding that former employee of 
building maintenance company intended to use its confidential 
cost data in unfair competition with its janitorial business 
where the records in his possession could have no value to 
him unless he desired to do janitorial work for less than 
the company's contract prices for the same service, and where, 
in the only two transactions shown in which he submitted 
bids to the company's customers, his estimates were higher 
than the amounts which it was receiving. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Harold B. Jeffery, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages resulting from acts of unfi:tir competi-
tion and for an injunction. Judgment for plaintiff reversed. 
A. V. Falcone and Arthur J. Manley for Appellant. 
Victor S. Cogen for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-For about three years, James A. West was 
employed by Aetna Building Maintenance Company, Inc., as 
a salesman and supervisor. After he left that employment 
and engaged in the same business, Aetna sued him for dam-
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ages assertedly resulting from unfair competition. A second 
cause of action was based upon a written contract which 
included an agreement by West to pay liquidated damages 
of $1,000 in the event that he failed to carry out its provisions. 
The appeal is from a judgment in favor of Aetna awarding 
it damages and permanently enjoining \7\f est from soliciting 
any of its customers. 
The complaint alleges that, during his employment, West 
became familiar with the details of its business, including 
customer lists, the extent and type of service required by its 
customers, the use of certain procedures, material and equip-
ment, the net costs of performing service for each customer 
and the charges made for it. Aetna claims that with this 
information, which, it asserts, constitutes trade secrets, West 
solicited some of its customers to transfer their patronage to 
him and obtained contracts to do work for them. 
The record includes a contract executed by the parties 
during the time of West's employment by Aetna. One pro vi-
sion of it is that West would not, during his employment and 
for a period of two years thereafter, disclose any trade secrets 
or business information acquired as an employee. Upon ter-
mination of his employment, he promised to surrender all 
business records and other property belonging to Aetna. He 
also agreed not to "solicit, serve and/or cater to any of the 
customers of the Company served by him" as an employee for 
a period of two years after termination of his employment. 
In the event that he breached any of the terms of the agree-
ment, he promised to pay $1,000 as liquidated damages, 
together with any exemplary damages which might be 
awarded in an action against him. Aetna retained the right 
to restrain the violation of the agreement. 
There is evidence showing that West had told three out of 
about 50 to 75 establishments with which he had worked for 
Aetna that he had gone into business for himself. He notified 
one of them of his intentions before leaving Aetna. The other 
two were informed of his plans after they learned that he had 
left Aetna. He visited one :firm three times without invita-
tion, but "he did not solicit business." Estimates for main-
tenance service were submitted to two :firms upon their invita-
tions. His estimates were similar to the contracts which these 
:firms had entered into with Aetna. In one instance, Aetna's 
contract had been cancelled before any negotiations were 
begun with West. 
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Samuel S. Zagel, president of Aetna, testified that West, as 
Aetna's supervisor, had been advised of the price received for 
each job and understood the amount of time and material 
allotted to it. He taught West how to estimate and sell a job, 
and trained him in the technique of window cleaning. The 
information given West, he said, was vital to the successful 
estimation of a contract in such manner as to avoid loss. 
vV est denied that he had received such information and 
training at Aetna. He testified that, for about 25 years prior 
to joining Aetna, he had worked as a janitor. 
According to Joseph K. Zagel, secretary of Aetna, he told 
\1\f est, as supervisor, the amount received from each client, the 
costs of servicing the account, and the particular require-
ments of each customer. West was given official records and 
also kept personal memoranda concerning the business of the 
clients. When he left Aetna's employment, he returned the 
office records but not his personal memoranda. 
vVest stated that he was not given the amount of the charges 
made to the customers of Aetna, nor the cost of doing the 
work. However, he was informed of their service require-
ments. At the time he left Aetna, he returned to it the list 
of customers which he had been using. While with Aetna, 
he kept a personal memorandum book containing notations 
of calls to be made in accordance with Joseph Zagel 's instruc-
tions. He did not return this book to Aetna. He admitted 
that, as to two of the Aetna customers whom he contacted 
after he went into business for himself, he understood the 
type of service required because of his experience with them 
and his general background of knowledge regarding the work 
to be performed. In one instance, he remembered the amount 
paid by the client. 
The evidence shows that approximately 250,000 business 
establishments in Los Angeles County use janitor service. 
Aetna has about 200 customers. Maintenance accounts are 
sold on the open market, being worth about three times the 
monthly billing. Usually the contracts may be cancelled upon 
giving a 30- to 60-day notice, and renewals depend upon the 
ability of the maintenance company. Generally, a cancella-
tion results from a customer's displeasure with the services 
given. Ordinarily, when a customer cancels a contract, he 
engages another company or employs janitors. As a result, 
Aetna and other companies spend much time and money in 
efforts to maintain good will and eradicate any ill feeling, 
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even after a contract has been cancelled. Frequently, a 
customer who has cancelled his contract renews it. 
Upon this evidence, the trial court found that West com-
menced a competing business and solicited and secured the 
maintenance business of three Aetna customers, whose names, 
addresses and requirements he learned while employed by 
Aetna. These acts were intended to, and did, damage Aetna's 
business. Unless restrained, West would .continue to divert 
Aetna's customers, to its irreparable damage. Other findings 
are that, notwithstanding his claim of coercion, West volun-
tarily executed the employment agreement, and later violated 
its provi~ions, but the court determined that it was too 
ambiguous to be enforced. 
In accordance with these findings, judgment was entered 
against West for $1,467. In addition, he was "permanently 
enjoined and restrained from soliciting, diverting, or taking 
away, directly or indirectly, any customers of the plaintiff . 
. . . and ... from performing janitorial or window clean-
ing service for any customer of the plaintiff whom defendant 
has persuaded to terminate his contract with plaintiff. . . . '' 
He also was restrained from divulging any confidential in-
formation pertaining to Aetna's customers. 
West attacks the evidence as being insufficient to support 
the findings of solicitation and of damages. There are no 
trade secrets in the building maintenance business, he asserts, 
and the record includes no evidence tending to prove that 
he used any trade secrets. In addition, he claims that the 
rights and duties of the parties have been determined dif-
ferently than provided in the employment agreement. 
Aetna analyzes the evidence as affording abundant support 
for the findings and judgment. In particular, it insists that 
the information which West secured from it constitutes trade 
secrets. 
Neither party has challenged the determination that the 
employment agreement is too ambiguous to be enforced. Nor 
does either of them rely upon the contract as governing his 
rights. The basic question presented by West as ground for 
reversal of the judgment is whether the court properly granted 
equitable and monetary relief upon the cause of action for a 
tort. He argues that the existence of the contract, even though 
unenforceable, precludes the court from granting more than 
the stated amount of liquidated damages. However, if the 
trial court's construction of the contract is correct, as he 
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concedes, the agreement is void (Civ. Code, § 1598.) It can 
have no effect upon the rights of the parties. 
[1] In the absence of an enforceable contract containing 
negative covenants to the contrary, equity will not enjoin 
a former employee from soliciting business from his former 
employer's customers, provided his competition is fairly and 
legally conducted. (Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 
24 Cal.2d 104, 110 [148 P.2d 9]; Rest., Agency, Cal. Annot., 
§ 396.) The question, therefore, is whether West was guilty 
of unfair competition in soliciting Aetna's customers. 
Considering the charge of solicitation, in the light most 
favorable to the findings the most shown by the evidence is 
that West informed Aetna's clients of the termination of his 
employment and his plans to go into business for himself. He 
also eagerly accepted business from Aetna's customers when 
it was offered to him. There is no evidence whatever of any 
suggestion to an Aetna customer that it cancel Aetna's con-
tract and give him the business. In one instance, he accepted 
an invitation to discuss business with a firm having a manu-
facturing plant and an office building upon the same premises. 
He submitted contracts to service both of them. Upon learn-
ing that Aetna still serviced the office building and the 
customer was satisfied with the work done there, although 
not in the plant, he made no further mention of the office 
building. 
[2] \Vest had the right to advise Aetna's customers that 
he was severing his business relations with it and engaging 
in business for himself. (Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. 
Moseley, supra.) In Theodore v. Williams, 44 Cal.App. 34, 
37 [185 P. 1014], the former employee advertised his new 
business association by driving a plainly labeled wagon along 
the laundry route which he had served for his former employer 
and by inserting announcements in newspapers. The court 
held that such activity did not violate an injunction against 
soliciting, either directly or indirectly, any business from 
customers of his former employer. 
[3] "Solicit" is defined as: "To ask for with earnestness, 
to make petition to, to endeavor to obtain, to awake or 
excite to action, to appeal to, or to invite." ·(Black's Law 
Dictionary, 3d ed., p. 1639.) "It implies personal petition 
and importunity addressed to a particular individual· to do 
some particular thing, .... " (Golden & Co. v . .Justice's 
Court, 23 Cal.App. 778, 798 [140 P. 49] .) It means: "To 
appeal to (for something); to apply to for obtaining some-
204 AETNA BLDG. MAINTEN'ANCE Co. v. WEsT [39 C.2d 
thing ; to ask earnestly; to ask for the purpose of receiving ; 
to endeavor to obtain by asking or pleading; to entreat, 
implore, or importune; to make petition to; to plead for; to 
try to obtain." (People v. Phillips, 70 Cal.App.2d 449, 453 
[160 P.2d 872] .) 
[4] Merely informing customers of one's former employer 
of a change of employment, without more, is not solicitation. 
[5] Neither does the willingness to discuss business upon 
invitation of another party constitute solicitation on the 
part of the invitee. ['6] Equity will not enjoin a former 
employee from receiving business from the customers of his 
former employer, even though the circumstances be such that 
he should be prohibited from soliciting such business. (Golden 
State Milk Prod. Co. v. Brown, 217 Cal. 570, 571 [20 P.2d 
657]; New Method Lat~ndry Co. v. MacCann, 174 Cal. 26, 32 
[161 P. 990, Ann.Cas. 1918C 1022]; Foster v. Peters, 47 Cal. 
App.2d 204, 206 [117 P.2d 726] .) West was entitled to 
accept business from Aetna's former customers and such 
acceptance, by itself, did not constitute solicitation. 
[7] However, even in the absence of solicitation, Aetna is 
entitled to protection against West's use, or disclosure in 
competition with it, of trade secrets given to him only for 
the purpose of carrying on his employer's business. (Reiss v. 
Sanford, 47 Cal.App.2d 244, 246-247 [117 P.2d 694]; Germo 
Mfg. Co. v. McClellan, 107 Cal.App. 532, 541 [290 P. 534]; 
Lab. Code, § 2860; Rest., Agency, § 396 (b) ; see cases col-
lected in165 A.L.R. 1453.) West takes the position that there 
are no trade secrets in the building maintenance business and 
there is no evidence of his use of a trade secret. Aetna, on 
the other hand, argues that its customer lists, knowledge of 
the requirements of various customers, the use of certain 
procedures, material and equipment, and its cost records are 
trade secrets. The evidence, it says, was sufficient to support 
the finding that West secured these secrets as its employee 
and wrongfully used them in competition with it. 
[8] The facts of this case do not justify the application 
of principles governing the rights of the parties in connection 
with retail delivery routes. Under such circumstances, as 
stated in George v. Bttrdusis, 21 Cal.2d 153, 159 [130 P.2d 
399], and other decisions, to obtain relief against a former 
employee it must be shown: (1) The information was confi-
dential and not readily accessible to competitors; (2) The 
former employee solicited the customers of his former employer 
with intent to injure him; ( 3) The former employee sought 
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out certain preferred customers whose trade is particularly 
profitable and whose identities are not generally known to 
the trade; ( 4) The business is such that a customer will ordi-
narily patronize only one concern ; ( 5) The established busi-
ness relationship between the customer and the former em-
ployer would normally continue unless interiered with. (Cali-
fornia Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal.App.2d 
197, 202 [188 P.2d 303], and cases there cited.) 
These factors are here absent. Prospective customers are 
commonly known to the trade or may easily be discovered 
through business directories or by observation. (Avocado 
Bales Co. v. Wyse, 122 Cal.App. 627, 634 [10 P.2d 485] .) 
There is no evidence that West sought out preferred customers. 
In any event, the evidence produced by Aetna is to the effect 
that there are no preferred customers in the trade. Accounts 
are sold upon the open market at fiat rates without regard 
to either their duration or profitableness. The evidence shows 
that the business is highly competitive and patronage depends 
upon efficiency of service rather than personal relationship. 
Contracts are of brief duration and cancellations are frequent. 
Under such trade conditions, equity will not enjoin the solicita-
tion of the former employer's customers. (Continental Car-
Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, supra, p. 111.) 
[9] Equitable protection may be invoked against the 
subsequent use by a former employee of knowledge of the 
''peculiar likes and fancies and other characteristics'' of the 
former employer's customers where such knowledge will aid 
him in securing and retaining their business. (George v. 
Burdttsis,, sttpra, p. 160; Dairy Dale Co. v. Azevedo, 211 Cal. 
344, 345 [295 P. 10] ; Pasadena Ice Co. v. Reeder, 206 Cal. 697, 
704 [275 P. 944, 276 P. 995] .) This rule applies where 
friendly contact with customers is important to solicitors, a 
circumstance typical of the so-called "trade route" cases. It 
has also been applied to situations involving a knowledge of 
the customer's desire for specialized information, his pref-
erence for certain products, and his buying habits. (California 
Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham, supra, p. 204; Wallick 
v. Koren, SO Cal.App.2d 223, 227 [181 P.2d 682] .) How-
ever, where, as here, superiority of product or service, rather 
than personal relationships or a secret specialty, is the basis for 
patronage, a knowledge 'of the customer's requirements is not 
sufficient reason for an injunction. (Continental Car-N a-V ar 
Corp. v. Moseley, supra, p. 111; DeLuxe Box Lunch &; Cater-
ing Co. v. Black, 86 Cal.App.2d 434, 441 [194 P.2d 715].) 
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Under circumstane0s of open eompetition, sueh knowledge is 
readily available to all in the trade. 
Insofar as methods of janitorial service are eoncerned, the 
evidenee shows no trade seeret. An instruetor of building 
maintenance testified to the standard teehniques and procedure 
which he taught both in the public schools and to Aetna 
employees. [10] "Matters of public knowledge or of general 
knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as 
his secret." (Rest., Torts,§ 757, com. b.) [11] No evidence 
was introduced which tended to prove that Aetna used any 
unusual or secret material or equipment. On the contrary, 
the evidenee shows that it regularly tested products of general 
use in the trade to determine which best suited its purposes. 
According to Aetna, its procedure for estimating the price 
of a new eontract, was a trade secret. However, no evidence 
was introduced tending to prove that Aetna had developed 
a secret, or even improved, system of making estimates. The 
very most whieh is shown by the evidence is that Aetna utilized 
a highly efficient system designed to meet competition and 
avoid losses. Of necessity, any competitior in the business 
must consider all of the factors which entered into Aetna's 
computations. There is a total absence of any showing that 
the method of making estimates are secret, or that West was 
informed of any claim of secrecy. Under these conditions, 
West was privileged to use ''methods of doing business and 
processes which are but skillful variations of general processes 
known to the particular trade.'' (Rest., Agency, § 396, 
com. b.) 
The evidence upon the question of whether West had 
access to Aetna's cost records is conflicting. The· trier of 
fact could have believed that 'West, during his employment, 
acquired knowledge of costs of doing business and took it 
with him. However, assuming, without deciding, that this 
information was secret, there is no evidence tending to show 
that he made unfair use of it in competing with Aetna, or 
intends to do so. 
[12] The evidence clearly shows that the janitorial busi-
ness does not depend upon patrons whose work can be done 
at an exceptionally low cost. Under these circumstances, the 
records in West's possession could have no value to him unless 
he desired to do janitorial work for less than Aetna's contract 
prices for the same service. But in the only two transactions 
shown in evidence where \¥est submitted bids to Aetna's 
customers, his estimates were higher than the amounts which 
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Aetna was receiving. He charged five dollars more for identi-
cal service in one case. On the other bid, he offered janitorial 
service only for $13.50 less than Aetna charged for both 
janitor and window cleaning service. Such evidence is in-
sufficient to support the finding that West used and intended 
to use Aetna's confidential cost data in unfair competition 
with H. 
'l'he judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., 'l'raynor, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
There is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's 
finding that defendant West obtained from plaintiff trade 
secrets which he used in soliciting its customers. 
In regard to the solicitation, the evidence shows that de-
fendant West advised three customers of plaintiff that he had 
severed his relation as an employee of plaintiff and had gone 
into business for himself. Obviously, that statement was 
made for the purpose of obtaining their patronage at plaintiff's 
expense. There is ample evidence to justify an inference 
which the trial court could draw to this effect. There is 
nothing in Cont1:nental Car-N a-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal. 
2d104 [148 P.2d 9], to the contrary. The court there merely 
said that an ex-employee may send out a form letter that he 
is engaging in business for himself. That does not mean, 
that under any circumstances, personally advising the former 
employer's customers of the severance of his relations and 
that he is engaging in the same business will not support an 
inference that he actually asked the customers for their 
patronage. Here defendant personally so advised the cus-
tomers and gave them his business card. He made such a 
call on three occasions on one of the customers. He took 
proposed contracts to another which were practically identical 
with those used by plaintiff with which he was familiar. In 
addition, plaintiff's officers called him on the telephone after 
he had contacted the customers and charged him with having 
violated his contract by soliciting its customers. Defendant 
did not deny the solicitation. He merely replied that he had 
a right to and was going ahead to make a living. Such a 
failure to deny solicitation constituted an admission of it by 
an adoption of the accusatory statement. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1870[3]; 10 Cal.Jur., 1070 et seq.) 
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In regard to the nature of the information obtained by 
defendant in his employment as being a protectible interest, 
the evidence is adequate to support the finding on this issue. 
The parties entered into an employment agreement and it 
was signed by defendant. Although it was void for un-
certainty, nevertheless, it contained statements that constituted 
admissions by defendant. It is recited therein that the parties 
aclmowledged that the ''good will, continued patronage and 
the list of names and addresses of its customers and their 
special requirements constitute the principal asset of the 
Company." Further that defendant in his employment "has 
become or will become acquainted with many of the said 
customers, their names, addresses, and special requirements, 
and will become acquainted with other and future customers 
and with the other confidential matters of the Company's 
business.'' In addition to that the evidence shows that 
plaintiff's contracts or accounts with its customers were not 
for merely one order or successive independent orders. They 
ran for a period of time. The character of the service was 
such that a customer would not be contracting with more 
than one supplier at the same time, as he might well do if 
only the purchase of supplies or products for resale were 
involved. The accounts had a definite marketable value which 
was in excess of the amount called for on the face of the con-
tract, the increased value being predicated on the prospects 
of renewal contracts in the future. Defendant was a super-
visor for plaintiff, and in that capacity, he obtained the lists 
of customers, made personal contact with them, considered 
their complaints concerning the service and endeavored to 
eliminate the cause for complaint. He learned from plaintiff 
the exact method of computing the cost of furnishing the 
service and the actual cost of jobs he later solicited, and the 
peculiarities and special requirements of the various customers. 
These factors bring the case squarely within the rule that 
customer lists are protected even though they may be obtain" 
able where each customer may be differentiated from the 
other in the nature of his requirements and the value of his 
patronage to the former employer. The rule is thus stated: 
''There is no merit in this assertion (that the customer lists 
were not secret), since obviously it is not merely the knowledge 
of the identity of the customers, but the friendly contact with 
them which is important to the solicitors : '. . . they became 
personally acquainted with the customers of the respondent, 
their respective places of residence, their peculiar likes and 
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fancies and other characteristcs, a knowledge of which would 
greatly aid them in securing and retaining the business of 
said former customers.' " (Dairy Dale Co. v. Azevedo, 211 
Cal. 344, 345 [295 P. 10].) In Scavengers P. Assn. v. Serv-U-
Garbage Co., 218 Cal. 568 [24 P.2d 489], the issue was 
whether a former employee of a corporation engaged in the 
garbage collection business could be prevented from soliciting 
customers of his former employer. This court held that he 
could, stressing the fact that some of the customers were 
preferred because they discarded material that could be 
salvaged and sold as junk. This is similar to the nature of 
the conditions, the premises of the persons desiring janitorial 
service, varying with each customer. As in that case, the 
case at bar involves customers who could be found from 
directories, as nearly everyone had garbage disposal service, 
but each customer had his peculiarities. 
The trial court had adequate justification for concluding 
that defendant employee had acquired the names of his 
employer's customers, the particular needs of each, what each 
complained of in respect to the service supplied by plaintiff, 
the idiosyncrasies of each, the particular needs for each job 
and the itemized cost thereof from actual experience while 
in the employ of plaintiff. Clearly the trier of fact could · 
infer that pleasing a person with cleaning service depends 
largely upon the person's personal opinion and taste of what 
constitutes a satisfactory job. By his contacts, and as the 
recipient of complaints, defendant was in a position peculiarly 
adapted to gaining such information. Assuming, as does 
the majority, that the quality of the service was a major 
factor in obtaining and keeping accounts, yet the holder of the 
yardstick is the person to whom the service is furnished and 
whose opinion may vary from other persons and each of 
the latter may vary as to each other. Defendant acquired 
that knowledge in the course of his employment and informa-
tion which was more than a part of his learning of the work 
generally. Having acquired that knowledge and information 
while in the employ of plaintiff, he sought to apply it to 
plaintiff's detriment by inducing plaintiff's customers to for-
sake plaintiff and employ him to do that which plaintiff had 
apparently blilen doing to the mntnal benefit and satisfaction 
of plaintiff and its customers before defendant interfered. 
I am in full accord with the views expressed in the opinion 
prepared by Mr. Presiding Justice Moore and concurred in 
by Mr. Justice McComb when this case was before the District 
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Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, 
(Cal.App.) 236 P.2d 390. 
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 31, 
1952. Shenk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[S. F. No. 18261. In Bank. July 8, 1952.] 
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